As the conclusion of the Copenhagen process draws closer by the day, nations are beginningto put a fine point on their most critical negotiating positions. Although there will be dozens of issues to be worked out next year—some of which will not be trivial—the strength of the “political agreement” in Copenhagen appears to be turning on three issues: financing, verification and trade. Securing a final deal in 2010 is not dependent on resolving each of the issues in Copenhagen, which indeed may be impossible, but cementing the “wrong” outcome on any one could seriously threaten the prospects for the next international climate change conference to be held in Mexico City.
Much has been made of the recent joint declaration from Brazil, South Africa, India and China (which no one in the western world seems to have seen) outlining their “non-negotiable” issues for Copenhagen: no legally binding commitments, no unsupported (unfinanced) actions, no verification of unsupported actions and no climate-related trade measures (such as border adjustments). More numerically-oriented points may also have been part of the discussion, but these four points are worth examining in further detail.
As discussed previously, the United States has made legally binding commitments (but not “caps”) for all major emitters a key component of its Copenhagen position, spurred on by the perception that this is one of the primary reasons the United States could not join Kyoto. While Indian and Chinese negotiators may not want to concede this point yet, it appears their leaders have a different perspective. Buried in the joint statements between Presidents Hu and Obama and Prime Minister Singh and President Obama are the words “stand by these commitments” and “stand behind these commitments” in reference to the climate actions they also pledged to take. It seems hard to believe these similar phrases got into both documents by accident, and while it would be a significant step, it is not inconceivable to get from “standing behind” commitments in an international statement to binding commitments in an international agreement.
The second point is similarly contradictory with recent events, as both China and India have not only been taking unsupported climate mitigation actions for several years (mostly in the guise of energy), but they have recently announced carbon-specific intensity targets. Indeed, both have stressed that their pledges are domestic actions taken in pursuit of domestic objectives.
The third is likely to be more difficult to resolve. Now that countries have put forward their mitigation numbers the next logical and most important deal for developing countries is on financing. One big concession the developed world wants from all major emitters is a commitment to international verification of their actions. This seems like the next likely deal, much more critical for securing congressional support than China bumping up its debatably strong pledge a few additional percentage points (something they are not expected to do). There has been movement towards a “fast start” fund of approximately $10 billion, and calls for recognition of “need” of approximately $100 billion to $150 billion in 2020—but this is likely to be the red line for the developed world in Copenhagen. It remains to be seen if this will be enough to secure the verification deal or if it will need to wait until more concrete 2020 numbers can be put on the table.
The fourth and final point could be the most challenging, as it blurs ideological and partisan lines. Some free-trading moderate Republicans will not vote for a bill with border measures, while some manufacturing-state Democrats will not vote for a bill without them. Internationally, the only real positive outcome in Copenhagen is to make sure they are not taken off the table. Down the road, a difficult deal will need to be struck potentially involving strengthening or better enforcement of intellectual property protections or other trade agreements, and likely a new international regime linking trade and climate.
Although this is certainly open for debate, the quantitative pledges by major emitters and the rushed, somewhat contradictory nature of the BASIC proposal reveals that the Copenhagen process, and particularly the re-engagement of the United States, has put large developing nations back on their heels. The United States’ willingness to get tough on large developing nations in the negotiations and President Obama’s outreach at the highest levels seems to be squeezing down the space for China, India and others to credibly defend a world where they have no international obligations on climate.
Andrew Stevenson is a research assistant at Resources for the Future and regular contributor to Common Tragedies.
