Carbon Pricing Is Dead. Long Live Carbon Pricing!, with Danny Richter

Notable Quotes

• The United States lacks a national carbon pricing policy, but carbon pricing has seen international uptake: “If you’re talking to people in the United States, people … are very down on carbon pricing. They think that it’s never going to happen, but it’s already happened in every other developed economy. So, it really is not a story of ‘carbon pricing is never going to happen.’ If you take the global view, carbon pricing is so hot right now.” (5:50)
• The flexibility of carbon pricing facilitates broad and lasting success: “[Carbon pricing] gives you so much flexibility to tweak how you place that price, where you place that price, and then total freedom in what you do with the revenue. You can match it to the politics of your particular jurisdiction. What are the quirks of your state, your country … your industry, and what do they need to move forward together? … I think that flexibility is why you see it in so many jurisdictions. You can meet so many different political moments, so many different contexts.” (9:13)
• Cap-and-invest programs have found success by emphasizing economic arguments over climate benefits: “Cap and invest is enabling voters to look at it as, ‘What are the investments? How do those investments help me? How do they help our state?’ It just enables a totally different conversation.” (16:28)

Top of the Stack

• Pricing Carbon Initiative
• “Fourth Generation Carbon Prices” by Danny Richter
• “Reserved: Carbon Pricing and the Dollar’s Special Status” by Danny Richter
• Carbon Pricing Dashboard from the World Bank
• “How Carbon Border Adjustments Might Drive Global Climate Policy Momentum” by Kimberly Clausing, Milan Elkerbout, Katarina Nehrkorn, and Catherine Wolfram
• Our Dollar, Your Problem by Kenneth Rogoff

The Full Transcript

Kristin Hayes: Hello and welcome to Resources Radio, a weekly podcast from Resources for the Future (RFF). I’m your host, Kristin Hayes.

Today, I’m talking with Danny Richter, director of the Pricing Carbon Initiative. As our listeners may know, economists generally think of carbon pricing as the most cost-effective policy to reduce carbon emissions, and numerous jurisdictions around the globe have experimented with various flavors of carbon pricing, including cap-and-trade programs and carbon taxes. Danny has closely followed the evolution of those programs through the ups and downs, moments of skepticism, and moments of promise.

I talked on the show a few months ago about carbon pricing specifically in Canada, but today’s conversation is our chance to take a step back and see how similar policy instruments are faring worldwide.

Carbon pricing is certainly out of favor at the federal level in the United States, but it still has legs in many other places. How have conversations around carbon pricing been evolving, and where do various jurisdictions go from here? Stay with us.

Hi, Danny. Welcome to the show.

Danny Richter: Hi, Kristin. It’s a pleasure to be here.

Kristin Hayes: Great. Well, it’s great to talk with you, and before we begin our substantive conversation, I’d love to ask you to introduce yourself to our listeners. Tell us a little bit more about you and how you got interested in this topic.

Danny Richter: My name is Danny Richter, and we’ll start in graduate school. I am an oceanographer. I got my PhD in oceanography. I was sent to all seven continents to push the limits of scientific knowledge just a little bit further. I learned how to surf, got married, and I started volunteering with a group called Citizens’ Climate Lobby. After basically a five-year job interview, they decided they wanted to hire me, and they sent me to DC. I was staffer number five or six, and we were working on carbon pricing. It was this learning by doing experience, where I had to figure out the politics, and figure out the economics—which obviously I had no training in at that point—and try and make it work.

I worked with Citizens’ Climate Lobby for nine years. We ultimately did get a carbon pricing bill introduced. It was the first bipartisan bill in nine years. It was the only one to be bipartisan in both the United States House of Representatives and the Senate, and I left the organization in 2022 with 200,000 volunteers. That bill had, I think, 96 cosponsors. It was the bill with the most cosponsors of any carbon pricing bill introduced in the Senate, and I landed with the Pricing Carbon Initiative.

As you mentioned, I’m now the director. That’s a pretty new thing. The founder, Tom Stokes, recently stepped away from day-to-day activities and he’s on to other projects, and the Pricing Carbon Initiative is just … it’s a network. It’s a network of folks who are interested in carbon pricing, and they’re quite diverse ideologically, geographically. We focus on the state level, the national level, the international level. We bring it all together, and there we interpret carbon pricing pretty broadly. We incorporate anything that affects people’s decision-making about climate futures in the present and we’ll call that a carbon price.

The social cost of carbon is fair game. Voluntary carbon markets are fair game. Probably the furthest afield would be insurance, housing insurance, which is kind of the inverse of a carbon price in that it’s uncontrolled risk. It’s what happens when you have costs imposed and an uncontrolled climate presence now, and carbon pricing is all about avoiding those things.

Kristin Hayes: Interesting.

Danny Richter: Yeah.

Kristin Hayes: You really have had a chance to sort of explore the full suite of impacts, policy designs, as you’ve mentioned, at the state, national, and international levels. I clearly have invited the right person for this conversation, I think.

Danny Richter: Let’s hope so.

Kristin Hayes: All right. Let’s start broad. I think it’s important to have a nice contextual question, as I always like to do. Maybe I can ask you to start out by telling our listeners about the broad state of carbon pricing programs.

I guess in a somewhat narrowly defined way—in this particular question—I am thinking mostly about either formal cap-and-trade programs or carbon taxes, but on a global level. Maybe give us just a quick rundown, if that’s even possible, but a quick rundown on which places actually have them in place right now, which are implementing them. Another thing I’m curious about is some flavor of the longevity of those programs. How many of them really have been around long enough to sort of know their impacts and how they’re faring in the public eye, versus ones that might be newer?

Danny Richter: The story I’m going to tell is one where I’d like everybody to examine their sampling bias. Here in the United States, we do not have a carbon price at the federal level. We have, I think it’s 14 at the state level. There are a couple of states that are considering new ones. 14 out of 50 doesn’t feel very good, but literally every other developed economy has one, and there are a bunch of developing economies that also have a carbon price. Globally, 24 percent of emissions are covered by a carbon price, and there are interesting things going on. For example, the International Maritime Organization just voted to impose a carbon price on shipping, and that’s one of those hard-to-decarbonize sectors where they’re saying, “No, we want this.”

There really is—if you’re in the United States—there’s a propensity to fall victim to your own sampling bias. If you’re talking to people in the United States, people in the United States are very down on carbon pricing. They think that it’s never going to happen, but it’s already happened in every other developed economy. So, it really is not a story of “carbon pricing is never going to happen.” If you take the global view, carbon pricing is so hot right now.

Kristin Hayes: Interesting. Maybe just to dive into that longevity question, too … How long has the longest program been established? Maybe that’s not the right way to frame it, but some of our oldest carbon pricing policies worldwide have now been around for a little while. We can actually see how they’re playing out in practice. Is that fair?

Danny Richter: 35 years.

Kristin Hayes: Wow. Okay.

Danny Richter: Yeah, going back to 1990, you saw the first few carbon pricing programs come into play. So, we do have quite a bit of data to do that. Going back to my PhD, even for oceanographers who like to look at long-term cycles, 30 years is really good. That’s a really good chunk of time.

Kristin Hayes: That’s a good data set. Yeah.

Danny Richter: That’s a good sample size.

Kristin Hayes: Okay. All right.

Danny Richter: We have a very good sample to figure out how they’re working, and it really is interesting. Once they pass, they tend to stay in place, and so it’s been really, really interesting. I think that some of the Canadian examples came out first. It was passed, and for a lot of people in the United States, it first came onto their radar when British Columbia passed their carbon price. It was a conservative government that did that, and they were reelected. I think when that policy was nationalized, you had the current party—I think it’s Liberals in Canada. Excuse me, Canadians, if I’ve mixed up your parties, but they’ve been—

Kristin Hayes: I think you got it. Yeah.

Danny Richter: They’ve been in power for quite some time now, and they kept the carbon price. So, even though that was a prominent campaign issue, and they are likely to scale that back, I don’t think they’re going to get rid of it. The trajectory has been that, once a jurisdiction passes a carbon price, they tend to keep it.

Kristin Hayes: Or even expand it, right?

Danny Richter: Or expand it.

Kristin Hayes: Expand it to new sectors, and I feel like that’s also how a lot of carbon prices have started. They start kind of focused on the electricity sector, but then there’s an interest in expanding them to transportation and maybe even industrial sectors. So, they both seem to have some staying power, but also the potential to be scaled up and down. Is that how would you characterize that?

Danny Richter: I would agree. There’s a growing literature about policy sequencing out there, and the idea is that you need to start with more carrots and you can transition to sticks. But, I think that you could do that just with carbon pricing. I think the trend is to, as you said, cover more sectors, have higher ambition in terms of the price, and just a lot more sophistication.

The thing that I like to emphasize with carbon pricing is that there’s so much room for creativity. The actual mechanism for emissions reduction is the price. So, however you set that, whether it’s with a cap or whether it’s with a tax, it’s hard to break. It’s hard to stop the signal that is getting people to reduce their emissions. If the price is there, they’re going to reduce their emissions. When you model this, since there’s excellent modeling at RFF, all they model is the price.

People, I think, assume that it’s how you spend the money that feeds back into it. Not in the modeling, and so with this robust policy response, as long as you’re putting a price on it, emissions go down. It gives you so much flexibility to tweak how you place that price, where you place that price, and then total freedom in what you do with the revenue, and you can match it to the politics of your particular jurisdiction. What are the quirks of your state, your country, in the International Maritime Organization, in your industry, and what do they need to move forward together? There’s a lot of flexibility, and I think that flexibility is also why you see it in so many jurisdictions. You can meet so many different political moments, so many different contexts.

Kristin Hayes: Interesting. Okay. Well, we’ve both talked about how at this moment in time, carbon pricing at the federal level in the United States is—I think it’s fair to say—it’s a nonstarter, but it hasn’t stopped individual US states at all. You mentioned 14—and some quite large states as well, with large economies, like California—and all of these have been fraught. If people follow the carbon pricing conversations closely, they’ll understand that there are constantly debates about all sorts of facets of the pricing, but, as you pointed out, they’ve had staying power. I want to talk about those states in just a little bit more detail. Maybe one thing I’ve been particularly intrigued by is that most of those states have gravitated toward carbon markets (or cap-and-trade programs, I should say), compared to carbon taxes. Do you have any thoughts on why that would’ve played out?

Danny Richter: Only speculation, which should be discounted appropriately. If we’re talking about California, one thing that always blows my mind is one out of every nine Americans is a Californian. Bonkers. I think that the markets provide more flexibility in terms of how you price and how people experience it. So, I think that they’re just a little more wiggly for politicians, and I think that that is appealing.

If you look globally—I think there are 75 jurisdictions that have a carbon price around the world—the majority are cap-and-trade, market-based mechanisms. I think that the people who are enacting this, they are politicians. Especially in the United States, I think that taxation is fraught, and cap-and-trade avoids … It’s an indirect way of imposing a cost on polluters, and I think the politicians have found that’s helpful to them in building the coalition they need to get it over the line.

Kristin Hayes: Interesting, and one of my colleagues here pointed out, too, that it may be easier in terms of flexibility to design a cap that you could move kind of without having to create a whole new policy instrument. Whereas, often, changing a level of taxation requires connecting with whole other parts of governments. It’s not just a single policy, but you have to go back and sort of redo the policy every time you want to change a tax level. So, that might also make it easier to actually give you that flexibility in the context of a cap-and-trade program compared to a carbon price.

Danny Richter: It may. I mean, you can build triggers into a tax. This is in that bill I mentioned that we helped get introduced. There was an automatic accelerator in that bill. So, if you weren’t meeting climate targets, then the price went up by, instead of $10, it went up by $15, and so there are ways to … Again, this just underlines the creativity aspect. It’s a fun space. Because the fundamental driver is so robust, you can play around a lot with that. So, that may be true, but I think that there are ways to legislate that ambition once, and so you don’t need to revisit it.

Kristin Hayes: Okay. That’s great. Well, you mentioned revenue, something that certainly plays a big role, I think, in the conversations these days about how carbon prices are in place and what that revenue is being used for. I just want to say—full disclosure, I based the title of this episode, or my recommendation for the title of this episode, on a newspaper headline that a colleague forwarded to me. It was particularly about carbon pricing in California. The headline of that article was, in quotes, “Carbon Pricing Is Dead. Long Live Cap and Invest.”

So, a little bit of a twist on our broader title here, but I want to talk about cap and invest in some of those revenue questions, too. Governor Gavin Newsom in California has really, I think, fully embraced—I’d be curious if you would agree with that take—but really embraced the rebranding of carbon pricing or cap and trade in the state of California as “cap and invest.” So, it’s this new label, and that term, “cap and invest,” has been growing in use in Washington, New York, Maryland, Vermont, and a bunch of other places that are considering these programs. Why do you think that people are opting for that different branding? Where does that kind of small difference in language come into play?

Danny Richter: The bottom line is I think that it enables politicians to talk about themes that voters like more. I think that’s the bottom line, but I also think the story of Washington State is really illustrative of that power.

At a recent dialogue we held, we had somebody talking about how there was a ballot initiative in Washington State, and the ballot initiatives for carbon pricing advocates in Washington State have been a source of trauma. There were two ballot initiatives to pass carbon prices in successive elections that took very, very different takes. One was very much emphasizing the business case and was modeled after British Columbia’s. The next one was emphasizing coalition-building, particularly on the Democratic side. It didn’t make much of a difference. They both failed, and the vote margins were within two points of each other, and the perception in Washington, DC, was, “Wow, if Washington State can’t get this done, no place can get it done.”

Then something very interesting happened. Governor Jay Inslee managed to pass the Climate Commitment Act through the legislature, so no ballot initiative. It built off the gains, the coalition-building with one of those ballot initiatives, and working through the legislature, you had more buy-in.

That brings us up to the last election where there was another ballot initiative, and this ballot initiative was to repeal the Climate Commitment Act. So, carbon pricing activists said, “Oh no, not again. We finally got a win here. Washington State always lets us down,” but it failed, which in this case means the carbon price got to stay. The story we heard from people who were working that campaign was that they really emphasized the investment part. They emphasized that … They didn’t talk about the climate part at all. They just said, “Here’s what this legislation is getting you, the voter,” and they focused on the benefits, the investments, and some of the polling for conservative districts flipped by 40, 45 percent in some of those counties, where they were voting for the pro–carbon price result.

You see this huge, huge flip, and so to me, that’s the power of the rebranding. Cap and invest is enabling voters to look at it as, “What are the investments? How do those investments help me? How do they help our state?” It just enables a totally different conversation, and, as I said, Washington State is so emblematic. I think that other states are learning from that success and the rhetorical tools that politicians can employ to really bring voters on board. To me, that’s what explains the trend.

Kristin Hayes: Yeah, great. Well, I would encourage our listeners, too, to keep a lookout for how the language continues to evolve, and you make a good point that it really does matter. It really can change the longevity of the policy.

Danny Richter: Yes.

Kristin Hayes: Well, let’s talk a little bit more internationally, then, because certainly the United States is where you and I are both based, of course, but, as you mentioned, most of the carbon prices in the world are not in the United States, interestingly. So, where have they been implemented? I guess this could apply either to the United States or abroad, but I’m thinking particularly abroad now. How are they being paired or not paired with other policies?

I guess, working with a bunch of economists, I think it’s fair to say that my economist colleagues here think of carbon pricing as a beautiful, standalone policy. It’s a policy that can do the work on its own by giving the right price signals and that sort of thing, but that doesn’t seem to be how it’s actually playing out in the real world. Lots of other things are coming alongside those carbon pricing policies. So, can you give us a flavor of what those complementary policies look like? Then, maybe more interestingly to me, is the question: How has the perspective on those complementary policies actually changed?

Danny Richter: Well, I’m going to start by recommending a tool to your listeners, the World Bank’s Carbon Pricing Dashboard. This has a great map, and it’s very easy to see and use and understand. The first policy that people pair carbon prices with are other carbon prices. So, if you look at the European Union countries who have the EU Emissions Trading System, there are a lot of other countries that also have their own national-level emissions trading system, or they have a carbon tax. So, countries are finding it productive to double up on carbon pricing, so that’s the first one they pair it with.

Then, other things, I mean, certainly, they can pair it with subsidies. You could pair it with renewable portfolio standards. Feed-in tariffs have been big in Europe for a while, so there are a lot of carbon markets, voluntary or compliance markets.

To me, the lesson I draw from this is that, once you have it, it’s very low profile. The carbon price doesn’t take up a lot of mental energy or energy to run well after you pass it, and I think it goes back to what I was talking about.

The mechanism by which it reduces emissions is very robust. It’s hard to break. If you make the emissions more expensive, people will emit less. So, I think that it actually, once passed, creates a very low mental profile, low burden, and it makes everything else easier, including other carbon prices. That’s the story that I’ve seen develop around the world. Europe, I think, is a great example, because the carbon price is so high there, and some of these other carbon prices that will pass within the same country are covering different sectors that the EU Emissions Trading System doesn’t cover. So, there’s a sectoral approach, going for completeness. I’ll highlight that, but the economists are right. It’s a very efficient policy that works well and enables you to do more things better.

Kristin Hayes: Interesting.

Okay, another important part of the international conversation is around something called carbon border adjustment mechanisms, or CBAMs. The EU has such a CBAM and the United States is also considering a related instrument, I guess I’d say, something around carbon intensity based tariffs. Can you refresh us on what those policies are all about and why they’re popping up in conjunction with carbon prices in certain parts of the world, or—in the case of the United States—even without a carbon price at the federal level?

Danny Richter: Ultimately, the story I’m going to tell here is one of … I think we’ve entered a new generation of carbon pricing policy, and I’ll get there. But, CBAMs: first of all, let’s just reflect on what a weird acronym it is. The first time I heard that, the person was French, so it was, “C-bomb,” but I also like the, “C-bam.”

Kristin Hayes: I know. It’s a fun one.

Danny Richter: It’s a fun one.

Danny Richter: Carbon border adjustment mechanisms are an add-on to a domestic carbon price, and in the EU case, as I’ve already mentioned, you have the EU Emissions Trading System. Up until this point, up until the EU added the CBAM, European producers were just forced to eat the carbon price. So, goods that they exported, there was no rebate, and goods that were imported, there was no comparable price on the goods that were competing for goods that had a high carbon price. Really, the way I think about it is, CBAMs are a policy for making it even-Steven within—that’s a technical term, even-Steven—within a given jurisdiction. That’s the fundamental logic there.

I think that, in my view, the really wonderful thing about these is that they’re inspiring other countries to act. They’re inspiring them to consider their own CBAMs. The EU, Taiwan, Singapore, Australia—all these places have carbon prices, and they’re now considering CBAMs. For countries that don’t have a carbon pricing policy, they’re considering putting them on their production.

For countries where the EU is a big export market, the choice is, basically, that you can pay the Europeans or you can keep that revenue. And that is a virtuous choice from the perspective of carbon emissions. There was a paper that came out recently, and I think it had RFF branding. Catherine Wolfram was on there at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and it was really making the argument and drawing the connections: “Look, here are all these places that have CBAMs, and here are the Google searches for carbon pricing and CBAMs and how they spike with different evolutions in the CBAM.”

Just with the discussion, the finalizing of the rule, the reporting only, and now we’re getting into—I think at the end of this year—where companies actually have to pay. All these different markers and how they inspire action in countries that are maybe thinking about it is great. CBAMs are encouraging higher ambition in the domestic market. They’re encouraging higher ambition in other countries, both for a CBAM of their own where there is an existing domestic carbon price, or for getting a domestic carbon price where they don’t have one.

This is this global forcer, which, as I said, in my view, is really pretty interesting. Now, you brought up the United States and that there is not a discussion for a domestic carbon price in the United States.

There is a discussion that harmonizes, I guess, really well with the tariffs that President Donald Trump has imposed, and the bill you have to talk about is the Foreign Pollution Fee Act, which mentions very clearly, it is not a carbon price, and nothing in this bill shall now or forever be interpreted to support a domestic carbon price. It’s not the exact language, but it’s a pretty good paraphrase. So, that would basically say, as you come into this country, you have to pay a fee based on the carbon intensity.

President Trump himself did talk about how unfair it is that other countries are exporting their pollution to the United States. That is a remarkable shifting of the Overton Window on just “polluters should pay” principles, that even President Trump is talking about it. So, I think that’s worth noting.

A distinction: It’s not a CBAM if there’s no domestic carbon price. It’s just a carbon border tariff, so that’s a distinction. If you’re talking about CBAMs, you’re really only talking about a place where they have a domestic carbon price.

I mentioned at the beginning of this now very long answer that I think we’re in a fourth generation of carbon pricing policy, at the federal level, not at the state level. And those are characterized as being fourth-generation carbon pricing policies, and they’re border forward, they’re sectoral, they’re revenue agnostic, and they’re intensity based, and the intensity-based and the sectoral element is a function of them being border forward. The third generation would’ve been the last 15 years or so, where you’re talking about economy-wide, mostly carbon taxes, and they were really going after every carbon atom. The second generation would’ve been Waxman-Markey. The first generation would’ve been the British Thermal Unit tax of the Clinton administration, and so … I just saw you shiver.

Kristin Hayes: Going way back in time there. Yeah.

Danny Richter: Way back in time.

Kristin Hayes: Yeah.

Danny Richter: Fourth-generation carbon prices have the border-forward element. Third-generation carbon prices in the United States, they all had border components, but they were like an appendix. You remove it, and it doesn’t really matter. You remove the border component of a fourth-generation carbon price, and it’s like removing the heart or the brain; the whole bill doesn’t work. And intensity based just means you don’t pay below a certain carbon intensity. You only pay above that. That enables countries to, say, be more in line with the World Trade Organization’s most favored nation and national treatment—a way to treat other countries fairly—and so you don’t pay.

That’s a feature, and then they’re sectoral, and this is not just limited to … They’re only going after the energy-intensive, trade-exposed (EITE) industries, for the most part, but you also see it in some other places. President Joe Biden’s budget had a tax on private jets and their fuels, and so I thought that was really interesting. You’re having people chop up our emissions and go, “and the methane fee.” That was another example of just going after a sector.

I think there’s a new round of creativity in American carbon pricing policymaking, and I think that, at the federal level, it is characterized by the fourth-generation carbon pricing policies. I have a blog on this. As a network, this framework—nobody’s written a scientific paper—I think it’s useful to give to new people or to welcome new people into our network. It helps them get up to speed more quickly and just have an overview of the last 35 years or so of carbon pricing policy, and just have a view for the rough things. That’s why I find it useful. Other listeners may not find it useful at all, but it’s fun to talk about.

Kristin Hayes: Well, that’s great, and we’ll definitely put a link to that blog in the show notes for this, too, so that folks can take a look. It’s really interesting to think about how not just how the policies have evolved, but how the conversation around the policies has continued to evolve to kind of meet the moment we’re in. Certainly, I think you’re absolutely right that issues around competitiveness and trade are at the forefront not only from that sampling bias of the United States, but they’re clearly something that people around the world are thinking about. I’m not surprised to hear your sense that those issues are kind of merging together in today’s carbon pricing conversations, too.

Danny Richter: Yeah.

Kristin Hayes: This has been great. Thank you for kind of reestablishing a foundation. I’m sure we will continue to talk about carbon pricing programs on the podcast as we move forward, since they are such an important part of the policy landscape globally. But it’s been great to just get reacquainted with the broad swath of ways that people are thinking about these worldwide. I really appreciate it.

Let me close with our regular final segment, Top of the Stack, where I’d invite you to recommend some more good content to our listeners.

Danny Richter: Yeah, on the top of my stack is Kenneth Rogoff’s book, Our Dollar, Your Problem. Another thing that I’ve been having fun thinking about recently is, why is the United States the only developed economy that doesn’t have a carbon price? Could it be because the dollar is the world’s reserve currency? This can’t prove it, but it’s fun to think about because it just unlocks, for a lot of people who’ve been stuck in the deadlock around this pricing policy, well, maybe this is something totally different. And this is something totally different, and the mechanism would be, having the world reserve currency affords policymakers very low interest rates on debt. I think that if we lose that—and that’s coming up in the news a lot with some policies that are around—then I think that you’re Liz Truss in Britain, who tried to cut taxes and increase spending and then ended up with the shortest premiership in the 300 years of the history of the position in Great Britain. I think that I call that American-style budgeting, and I think you can only get away with that in America, and I think it’s because of the dollar. It’s interesting to unlock conversations, unlock new ways of thinking, which is so important in the work we do at the Pricing Carbon Initiative.

That’s at the top of my stack. I’d encourage others to check it out. I haven’t read the book yet. But anything I can get my hands on that helps explain currencies and how they affect things like interest rates or sanctions, I think that’s … we’re in a geopolitical moment where people are very interested in what other countries are doing, and this is a key piece that we haven’t had to think about for 80 years, and I think now we do. I hope others will join me in thinking about that as well.

Kristin Hayes: Sounds great. All right, thanks, Danny. It’s been great.

Danny Richter: Thanks, Kristin.

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